Control of critical minerals is starting to decide who leads in chips, batteries, missiles, grids, and the factories that make them. China holds the strong hand, less because it has every deposit, more because it dominates processing and refining. That dominance has turned minerals into a security issue in Washington. Policymakers now talk about reducing single-point dependence and widening supply options.
Under President Trump, securing access to rare earths and other strategic inputs has moved up the agenda. The United States can turn to partners like Australia, Canada, Brazil, Vietnam, and several African producers. Yet many alternatives come with delays and costs tied to permits, infrastructure, and long build timelines. That is why Pakistan looks attractive. It sits close to the Arabian Sea, it has a large resource base, and it wants foreign capital. Pakistani officials cite major coal and copper reserves and promote a multi-trillion-dollar mineral potential.
Washington has signaled interest in extraction in Balochistan, including reported financing interest through the US Export Import Bank
But minerals do not move in a vacuum. Balochistan is also a security theater where rivalries collide. India worries that China’s footprint in Pakistan will harden into a strategic advantage, and it sees Gwadar as a symbol of that shift. A functioning deep-sea port on Pakistan’s coast can re-route trade and shorten energy routes. India also views Balochistan as a pressure point against Pakistan. Persistent insurgency bleeds Pakistan’s security budget, chills investment, and raises the cost of Chinese projects tied to the port and corridor plans.
Washington is not blind to these risks. The Balochistan Liberation Army has been designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization, and attacks on workers or infrastructure clash with any plan to build mines, roads, and power lines. If the United States wants access to Pakistan’s mineral output, it needs a stable operating picture.
Investors will not commit if the main risk is not price swings, but bombs, kidnappings, and work stoppages
Pakistan’s western border adds another layer. The Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan operates from Afghan soil, and its attacks have deepened mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. Here, the idea of an Indo Taliban nexus gains traction. India does not need to command Afghan militants to benefit from Pakistan’s distraction and border strain. It only needs the conflict to persist. A permissive space in Afghanistan that enables cross-border violence weakens Pakistan’s ability to secure Balochistan and reassure investors.
The spillover matters for Central Asia too. The Central Asian republics want routes that reduce reliance on Russia and widen access to global markets. A stable Afghanistan that connects north to Pakistani ports would help the US’s aims. That logic collapses if Afghan territory remains a staging ground for militant networks.
Insecurity scares financiers, disrupts corridors, and makes every shipment vulnerable
So will Washington let these rivalries stymie its mineral strategy? The United States has two instincts. One is to lean toward India as a partner in balancing China. The other is to treat supply chain resilience as its own mission, even when partner behavior undercuts the stability minerals require. If Washington prioritizes minerals, it cannot treat Pakistan only as a security threat. It will need a transactional bargain: investment and market access in exchange for stronger protection, clearer rules, and credible guarantees for projects in Balochistan.
That bargain also needs realism about China. Beijing is already embedded in Pakistan’s economy and infrastructure, and it can absorb delays more easily because its processing base is global. Pakistan’s minerals matter more to the United States because Washington lacks the same refining cushion.
If the United States stays absent, China will keep shaping terms through financing and offtake deals. Refusing engagement because the region is messy does not reduce risk; it hands leverage to a rival
A smarter US approach is to separate its India partnership from any tolerance of proxy chaos. Washington can deepen defense and tech ties with New Delhi while still drawing clear lines against support for violence that targets economic assets. It can also press Kabul, through incentives and pressure, to deny safe haven to militants focused on Pakistan and the region. This is not about romantic talk of harmony. It is about stable extraction zones, protected logistics, and a credible path from mine to market.
Will the United States allow an Indo Taliban dynamic to block access to Pakistan’s critical minerals? It should not. If Washington wants diversified mineral supply chains, it has to invest in stability where the minerals sit. That means engaging Pakistan on security and governance in Balochistan, pushing against militant sanctuaries, and refusing to excuse proxy games by any partner. Minerals reward the side that can turn deposits into a dependable supply.
