In response to Western sanctions and its estrangement from European markets due to the Ukraine conflict, Russia has escalated its strategic shift towards Southeast Asia, a region that is becoming increasingly crucial for its economic sustainability and geopolitical objectives. This transition, propelled by energy collaboration, climate initiatives, and an intention to mitigate US and Chinese dominance, exemplifies Moscow’s adaptable approach to acquire new markets and enhance its global position. By aligning with the developmental and environmental concerns of Southeast Asia, Russia is establishing itself as a versatile partner in one of the world’s most dynamic regions.
Energy exports provide the foundation of Russia’s involvement in Southeast Asia. In response to the closure of European markets, Russia has shifted its oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments to Southeast Asia, capitalizing on the region’s increasing energy requirements. In the first quarter of 2025, Russia delivered more than 500,000 metric tons of oil to Indonesia, employing innovative ship-to-ship transfers near the coastlines of Malaysia and Singapore to circumvent logistical obstacles. These initiatives are components of a comprehensive strategy to incorporate Russian energy resources into regional infrastructure projects, especially in swiftly industrializing nations such as Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, where electricity demand is escalating.
Russia’s LNG initiatives, including the Arctic-2 project, seek to enhance its foothold in Asian markets; nevertheless, advancement is dependent on foreign technology and funding. Concurrently, nuclear energy has arisen as a strategic instrument. State-owned Rosatom has obtained contracts with Vietnam and Myanmar to construct nuclear power facilities, including a 110-megawatt facility in Myanmar, establishing Russia as a principal supplier of low-carbon energy solutions. These projects not only fulfil Southeast Asia’s energy security requirements but also establish enduring dependencies, since Russia manages all aspects from reactor building to waste disposal.
Russia’s realignment coincides with the climatic objectives of Southeast Asia. Numerous nations in the region, like Indonesia and Thailand, have pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, hence generating a demand for sustainable energy infrastructure. Russia has leveraged this opportunity by advocating its nuclear technology as a dependable, non-carbon-emitting energy source. Rosatom’s public awareness initiatives in Vietnam and Thailand highlight the significance of nuclear energy in addressing climate change, addressing regional scepticism through workshops and educational programs.
Furthermore, Russia is allocating resources to renewable energy initiatives, particularly hydropower in Laos and Cambodia, where untapped water resources present prospects for regional grid stability. These programs not only facilitate Southeast Asia’s shift to greener energy but also bolster Russia’s reputation as a contributor to global climate resilience. Russia’s participation in regional forums such as the ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM) highlights its dedication to positioning its technical exports in relation to climate action.
Russia’s involvement extends beyond energy and climate considerations to encompass significant geopolitical dimensions. Moscow seeks to establish itself as a “third force” in the US-China conflict by reinforcing military and economic alliances. The naval exercises with Indonesia and Vietnam, together with significant arms transactions, including Vietnam’s importation of $7.4 billion in Russian equipment from 1995 to 2019, illustrate Russia’s intention to assert dominance in disputed maritime regions such as the South China Sea. These agreements enable Southeast Asian countries to diversify their security dependencies while affording Russia strategic footholds.
Economically, Russia’s trade with ASEAN is rather minor, amounting to 18.2 billion in 2019, in contrast to China’s 644 billion. However, Russia is actively seeking free trade agreements via the Eurasian Economic Union to enhance integration. Vaccine diplomacy throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly the Sputnik V agreements with the Philippines and Indonesia, reinforced its soft power effect. These initiatives constitute a comprehensive strategy to undermine US hegemony and advocate for a multipolar world order, with Russia as a pivotal actor in influencing regional dynamics.
Notwithstanding these advancements, Russia encounters considerable obstacles. Its economic presence in Southeast Asia is tiny compared to that of China and the US, constraining its influence. Reliance on Chinese funding and markets for energy initiatives, including the Power of Siberia pipeline, renders Moscow vulnerable to Beijing’s negotiating leverage, hampering its pursuit of autonomy. Moreover, Western sanctions persist in obstructing access to essential technologies for LNG projects, hindering Russia’s ability to completely compensate for lost European earnings.
As Russia advocates for nuclear energy internationally, the thawing of permafrost and wildfires domestically jeopardize its infrastructure and economic stability, potentially reallocating resources from outside initiatives. Furthermore, Southeast Asian countries exercise caution regarding excessive dependence on Russia, maintaining a balance with ASEAN’s concept of neutrality.
Russia’s strategic shift towards Southeast Asia demonstrates a realistic adjustment to global realignments. Moscow aims to safeguard economic lifelines and enhance its influence in a contentious region by interweaving energy exports, climate diplomacy, and geopolitical manoeuvring. The viability of this policy depends on surmounting economic constraints, managing Sino-Russian tensions, and mitigating internal climate risks. As Southeast Asia becomes a focal point of great power rivalry, Russia’s capacity to harmonize ambition with adaptation will dictate its efficacy in transforming both regional and global dynamics.
