India presents itself as a responsible nuclear power with mature regulatory institutions and rigorous command-and-control systems, a narrative that has gained traction globally as New Delhi expands its strategic partnerships and advanced weapons programs. However, a careful reconstruction of publicly documented incidents over the last two decades paints a more troubling picture, one that reflects a pattern of material mismanagement, weak institutional oversight, and periodic procedural breakdowns. Rather than isolated mishaps, these episodes reveal systemic vulnerabilities, many of which remain unresolved. For a state with an expanding civil and military nuclear footprint, such a record deserves sustained scrutiny rather than rhetorical dismissal.
Among the most disturbing elements of India’s nuclear safety trajectory is the repeated appearance of radioactive material outside authorized custody. The most infamous example remains the 2010 Mayapuri radiation accident in New Delhi, where a Cobalt-60 irradiator once used by Delhi University was sold as scrap. Its dismantling in a local junk yard exposed laborers and residents to intense radiation, causing severe injuries and at least one death. The International Atomic Energy Agency later identified the episode as a serious failure in the management of disused radioactive sources, an indictment not just of one institution but of the regulatory ecosystem charged with supervising such materials.
What Mayapuri demonstrated was not a fluke but a collapse in custodial responsibility: a research device containing a high-activity source somehow exited controlled storage without proper documentation, oversight, or alarms
Subsequent incidents confirmed that Mayapuri was not an aberration. In 2019, a Cesium-137 source belonging to the state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corporation went missing in Andhra Pradesh, only to be recovered from a scrap dealer after a police search. Such discoveries were not the result of routine monitoring or rapid detection; they were reactive responses triggered only after authorities recognized a loss. Each incident underscores weaknesses in inventory control, lifecycle management, and real-time tracking, foundational elements of a credible nuclear-safety culture.
Even more disquieting is the pattern of uranium seizures inside India, cases that strike at the core of the country’s claim of tight control over sensitive nuclear material. In 2016, police in Thane seized nearly nine kilograms of depleted uranium from individuals attempting to sell it illicitly. The material was authenticated by India’s premier atomic research center, leaving little doubt about its legitimacy or potential origin within controlled facilities. This episode alone would have raised questions, but the pattern deepened in 2021 when two significant seizures occurred within weeks of each other. Maharashtra’s Anti-Terrorism Squad recovered over seven kilograms of natural uranium in May, followed in June by another seizure of more than six kilograms in Jharkhand. While none of this material was weapons-grade, its very presence in illegal circulation raises red flags about supply-chain leakages, the strength of physical security, and the adequacy of deterrent measures. These are not one-off instances of petty criminality; they are symptoms of systemic failures in materials accounting and enforcement.
In nuclear security, even the perception of porous controls is damaging, because unauthorized movement of uranium, regardless of enrichment level, signals deeper structural lapses
The issue is not limited to uranium. Over the past decade, Indian law enforcement has detained individuals attempting to traffic highly regulated isotopes such as californium or sealed radioactive devices with questionable provenance. Although some claims turned out to involve counterfeit materials, enough verified cases have emerged to warrant concern about how such items leave controlled environments in the first place. Each time a radioactive source surfaces in a marketplace, the same unanswered questions recur: where did the chain of custody break down, and why did detection occur only after accidental discovery or opportunistic policing?
If these materials-handling failures expose regulatory weaknesses, the March 2022 accidental launch of a BrahMos supersonic cruise missile revealed a different but equally consequential vulnerability: procedural failure at the strategic level. According to India’s own explanation, the missile was fired inadvertently during maintenance and traveled across an international border before crashing. In any nuclear-armed environment, particularly one with a history of military crises, such an incident carries extraordinary escalation risks. The BrahMos is widely regarded as dual-capable; even if the launched missile did not carry a nuclear payload, the absence of immediate transparency amplified the danger of misinterpretation. India eventually acknowledged the mistake and disciplined personnel, but the event exposed deficiencies in technical safeguards, operational discipline, and crisis-communication protocols.
In strategic weapons management, redundancy and fail-safes are not optional; their failure can trigger catastrophic consequences
These recurring lapses unfold against a backdrop of evolving Indian nuclear doctrine that occasionally departs from past clarity. Although India maintains an official No First Use policy, repeated statements by senior officials have cast ambiguity on its permanence or conditionality. Meanwhile, India continues expanding precision-strike capabilities and dual-use platforms, developments that increase the complexity of command-and-control arrangements and raise the risk of misinterpretation during crises. When doctrinal ambiguity converges with operational lapses, the stability calculus becomes more fragile.
India indeed possesses regulatory agencies and codified safety protocols, but repeated breaches indicate enforcement deficits rather than regulatory absence. In several cases, the recovery of missing radioactive sources occurred not because of alert detection systems but due to chance, whistleblowers, or police investigations unrelated to nuclear oversight. This pattern underscores the need for more rigorous, transparent, and accountable safety governance. For a nuclear-armed state, systemic weaknesses cannot be compartmentalized as public relations issues or bureaucratic errors; they represent real risks to public safety and regional stability.
A credible nuclear power does not rely on narrative management to maintain legitimacy. It upholds stringent standards, addresses deficiencies openly, and embraces scrutiny as a means of strengthening its institutions. India’s cumulative record of lost radioactive sources, uranium trafficking incidents, and accidental missile launches provides ample evidence that reforms are overdue. Unless material control, institutional discipline, and procedural safeguards improve substantially, concerns about India’s nuclear safety will persist, and they will persist not because of foreign criticism, but because of documented facts within India’s own borders.
